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1 
From horizontal to vertical labour governance: the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) and decent work in global supply chains 
 
Abstract 
The role of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in the governance of global supply 
chains is typically neglected or simply dismissed as ineffective. This is understandable as 
global supply chains have undermined the traditional nation-State (horizontal) paradigm of 
global labour governance, most notably the international Conventions agreed by the tripartite 
constituents (governments, employers and workers’ representatives) of the ILO. But this 
simply poses the question of whether, and if so how, the ILO can reframe the system of global 
labour governance to include the (vertical) global supply chains that all too often fail to 
deliver ‘decent work for all’. Based on an extended ethnographic study, we demonstrate how 
policy entrepreneurs (international civil servants) within the ILO can play a pivotal role in not 
only reframing the discourse in a way that resonates with the ‘lived experiences’ of 
constituents but also ‘orchestrate’ the social partners in order to secure majority support for a 
process that might ultimately lead to a new standard (Convention) for decent work in global 
supply chains. A new approach to employment relationships in global supply chains is ‘in the 
making’ with the potential to improve working conditions and rights at work for millions 
across the globe. 
  
 
2 
Introduction 
Few would argue that current forms of international regulation that govern the activities of 
firms in global supply chains can guarantee ‘decent work’ for all. Whether in the form of 
corporate codes of conduct (Locke, 2013), international framework agreements (Niforou, 
2014), or an international Accord or Better Work programme for a particular country/sector 
(Reinecke and Donaghey, 2015; and Posthuma and Rossi, 2017), it is clear that the emerging 
system of global labour governance based predominantly on private, voluntary and self-
regulatory standards, with a focus on compliance by business (rather than governments) via 
the market mechanism (rather than hierarchical authority), leaves significant ‘governance 
gaps’ that have yet to be closed (Hassel, 2008). Historically, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) played a significant role in the ‘equalization’ of (labour cost) ‘competition 
among the nations so that trade might be liberated without danger to standards of living’ 
(Polanyi, 1944: 27-8). In more recent years, in contrast, the ILO appears to be ‘adrift’ (e.g. 
Marginson, 2016: 1051) and unable to depart from its (path dependent) past and the 
‘particular constellation of interests and power resources prevailing at the time of its 
foundation’ (Baccaro and Mele, 2012: 218; see also Royle, 2010; and Standing, 2008). The 
significance of this seemingly parlous state of affairs cannot be underestimated: if multilevel 
(public) forms of labour regulation are needed to close global governance gaps, the ILO is the 
only international organization with the constitutional mandate to bring capital, labour and the 
state together to promote decent work in global labour supply chains.  
For the ILO, global supply chains present a particular challenge, not simply because 
there are estimated to be well over 450 million workers employed in these chains (ILO, 2015: 
132) but more importantly because the multilevel governance structure of ILO Conventions 
(international labour standards ratified by member States) do not follow the (convoluted) 
vertical lines of global supply chains but the horizontal (sovereign) space of member States’ 
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jurisdiction. A global labour governance regime to promote decent work in global supply 
chains demands vertical and not simply horizontal regulation of labour standards, as Guy 
Ryder, the current Director-General (D-G) of the ILO, has been at pains to point out: 
‘National governments ratify [Conventions] and are responsible for answering to the 
ILO for their observance. It’s a nation state based approach to international labour 
behaviour. There has been a growing feeling, an accumulation of feelings, that the 
advent of globalization, the development of supply chains and production networks, 
has led to a risk … that this purely nation state approach to the behaviour of the 
globalized economy risked missing the dimension that was the transversal integration 
of production networks across countries. I think we knew it and I don’t think we knew 
what to do about it’ (Ryder, 2015, emphasis added). 
In order to determine ‘what to do about it’, the ILO must start with new policy ideas 
that, over time and in combination, might develop into a new policy programme guided, as 
always, by the founding (philosophical) principle that ‘labour should not be regarded as 
merely a commodity or an article of commerce’ (ILO, 1919). The moral legitimacy of this 
basic principle not only shapes the underlying assumptions and content of policy proposals, 
but also constitutes an emancipatory ‘discursive weapon’ that informs the reframing of reform 
imperatives. To be sure, new ideas only become a causal factor under specific institutional 
and political conditions (Béland, 2009: 702), but international organizations are more ‘open’ 
than most historical institutional accounts acknowledge, and where policy consensus is the 
exception rather than the rule there is always an opportunity for new ideas espoused by well-
positioned policy entrepreneurs (Béland and Orenstein, 2013).  
Under the guidance of its D-G, the Constitution of the ILO accords the International 
Labour Office (hereafter ‘the Office’) a ‘substantial degree of autonomy … to the point of 
establishing [this autonomy] as the Organization’s hallmark’ (Maupain, 2013: 118). In fact, at 
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critical moments in its history, the leadership of the ILO has put forward bold policy 
programmes (Cox, 1965: 102; Helfer, 2006: 681; and Hughes and Haworth, 2011: 2), albeit 
with greater impact on the institutional solidity of the Organization than the world of work 
(Haas, 1964; and Alston, 2004). The challenge for the ILO in the twenty-first century is 
therefore to go beyond the articulation of new policy ideas to the instigation of a new policy 
programme that might eventually guarantee decent work in global supply chains – the goal, 
simply put, is to create a new ‘policy paradigm’ for global labour governance, ‘a framework 
of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and kind of instruments that 
can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing’ (Hall, 1993: 279). 
Translating policy ideas into a policy programme that might eventually create a new 
policy paradigm is a prolonged and contested process. If sentient (thinking and speaking) 
agents are to be the drivers of change, and their ideas (what they think about what to do about 
it) and discourse (what they say about what to do about it) are the vehicles of change, then 
they must ‘break the path’ of past dependencies and seize the opportunities presented and 
created by the institutional context in which they operate, where their ideas have meaning, 
their discourses have communicative force, and their collective actions make a difference 
(Schmidt, 2011: 119). Such purposeful communication (strategic framing) relies on both 
understanding (resonance) and support (collective action), or text with context and words with 
deeds. For the ILO, the first step along the path towards a new policy paradigm was to put the 
issue of decent work in global supply chains on the agenda of the International Labour 
Conference (ILC) – the so-called ‘parliament of labour’ (Morse, 1969: 43) – as this is ‘the 
most significant and visible expression of the actions of the ILO in carrying out its mandate to 
assist its Members in giving effect to the Organization’s constitutional objectives’ 
(GB.323/INS/2, para.1). 1  At the ILC in June 2016, the ILO’s tripartite constituents 
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(governments, employers and workers’ representatives) agreed to: ‘Consider what guidance, 
programmes, measures, initiatives or standards are needed to promote decent work and/or 
facilitate reducing decent work deficits in global supply chains’ (ILC.105/PR/14-1, para.25, 
emphasis added). Inclusion of the word ‘standard’ is paramount because, in ‘ILO-speak’, this 
opens the door to a future Convention on decent work in global supply chains. 
The ‘outcome’ (agreed Conclusions) of the ILC constitute an ‘input’ to an on-going 
process that starts with ideas and discourse, framed by policy entrepreneurs within a particular 
(internal) institutional setting and subject to (external) environmental constraints and political 
opportunities. In the following section, we demonstrate how the protracted policy-making 
process of the ILO lends itself to process rather than variance analysis (i.e. an exploration of 
the temporal structure of social practices and the uncertainties and urgencies that are 
inherently involved in such practices) (Langley et al, 2013: 4), ideally from the perspective of 
a ‘participant-as-observer’ (Gill and Johnson, 2010: 167) with access to data from ‘behind the 
scenes’ as well as the ‘public record’. In the subsequent section, we demonstrate how the 
framing of new policy ideas comes into sharper focus through the theoretical lens of 
discursive institutionalism, which seeks to ‘show empirically how, when, where, and why 
ideas and discourse matter for institutional change’ (Schmidt, 2010: 21; see also Béland and 
Orenstein, 2013: 137). The policy-making process within the ILO – translating ideas into 
action – is one of ‘orchestration’ (Abbott et al, 2015: 3) by the Office, whereby policy 
entrepreneurs provide ideational and material support to the ILO’s tripartite constituents, most 
notably labour, in order to address target actors in pursuit of the Organization’s governance 
goals. The ILO’s target is global supply chains and in particular the trans-national 
corporations (TNCs) who coordinate and control their activities through these chains. The aim 
is to establish a new standard (Convention) for vertical regulation along these chains, 
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providing tripartite (horizontal) actors at the national level with greater leverage to protect and 
promote decent work. 
 
Researching the contentious (re)framing of ILO policy making 
‘Access to, and control of, international organizations is a valuable prize. Policy 
entrepreneurs and their networks compete to define the policy ideas and agendas of 
international organizations’ (Béland and Orenstein, 2013: 136). 
For neo-institutional theory, ‘frames represent one of the few constructs that coherently 
connect macro cognitive schemas to local contexts of discursive interaction’ (Cornelissen and 
Werner, 2014: 214). All too often, however, ‘frames’ and ‘framing’ are conflated, with a (post 
hoc) focus on outcomes that are assumed to reflect how social actors inferred the ‘right’ frame 
and behaved accordingly. To be sure, ‘what actually happened’ must always be part of the 
analysis, ‘because whether and how ideas and discourse lead to collective action help in the 
assessment of the credibility and feasibility of the ideas and discourse as well as of the 
intentions of the agents’ (Schmidt, 2014: 190-1). Nonetheless, there is a tendency to highlight 
cognition, and thus frames, as separate from discourse and action (or framing), or to collapse 
frames and framing into the same construct, resulting in a singular and narrow focus on 
outcomes at a particular level of analysis (Cornelissen and Werner, 2014: 215). Instead of 
trying to ‘name’ frames and how they prime certain thoughts and behaviours, we need to 
focus on the dynamics of framing and eschew the assumption that frames exist in discourse as 
separate and coherently bounded symbols or thoughts (Cornelissen and Werner, 2014: 220). 
Our starting point is therefore the proposition that analyzing events as they unfold, in 
data-rich ‘real time’, is preferable to retrospective analysis of the sparse and synthetic official 
record (Langley et al, 2013: 11). If we accept that ‘ideas matter’, and especially the ideas of 
policy entrepreneurs, we ‘cannot assume much about their intent without doing a detailed 
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analysis of the thinking and expert debates taking place within the organization’ (Béland and 
Orenstein, 2013: 137). Such processes, like all process data, are ‘notoriously challenging’ 
(Langley, 1999: 706), as the data is multi-level (e.g. inputs to the ILO from different 
industrial sectors, different member States, and international organizations representing 
employers and workers); multi-unit (e.g. official meetings of the ILO’s Governing Body, ILC, 
and sector- or subject-specific tripartite meetings); of varied temporal embeddedness (e.g. 
when new policy ideas are first imagined, articulated, agreed and then implemented); and 
eclectic (e.g. the official record of ILO meetings, informal discussions and negotiations, the 
changing relationships between different actors, and the impact of political opportunities). In 
the ILO, all these elements come together in the coordinative policy making process, where 
there is a clear sequence of events (formal and informal meetings), focal actors (protagonists 
and antagonists), an identifiable voice reflecting the viewpoint of the tripartite constituents 
(member States, the Employers’ Group and the Workers’ Group), an evaluative frame of 
reference of what is ‘right’ (appropriate) and ‘wrong’ (inappropriate) (i.e. labour is not a 
commodity and must not be treated as such), and other indicators of context over time and 
place (e.g. political opportunities that arise when indecent work hits the headlines) (cf. 
Pentland, 1999). 
Framing within the ILO is clearly an interactive process, which raises the question of 
how ‘common ground’ (agreed text) is established in and through repeated interactions at the 
organizational level. According to Cornelissen and Werner (2014: 219), in order ‘to study the 
ongoing and interpretive process of framing and meaning construction across actors and 
across time’ we need to ‘move closer to the action’ via ethnographic methods. Participant 
observation places the researcher at the heart of the ‘meaning context’ where ideas and 
discourse make sense and where formal arrangements affect how, when and where 
(re)framing matters. Serendipitously, an initial 6-month internship (January-June 2013) for 
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one of the researchers coincided with the appointment of Guy Ryder to the position of D-G, 
which proved to be a significant event as personal biographies matter (Cornelissen and 
Werner, 2014: 216) and Ryder is the first leader of the ILO to be clearly identified with the 
‘workers’ side’.2 The internship was followed by an 18-month (fixed-term) contract (July 
2013 to December 2014), with a succession of subsequent short-term contracts including 2 
weeks working for the Office during the ILC 2016. Throughout this period, the research on 
decent work in global supply chains was overt, but the transition from intern to international 
civil servant occasioned a shift from ‘observer-as-participant’ to ‘participant-as-observer’ (i.e. 
from a spectator to a fully-fledged participant) (Gill and Johnson, 2010: 167). The 
‘participant-as-observer’ (PAO) is much better placed to understand ‘what is said’ and ‘how 
things work’ when employed alongside other social actors, thereby developing the 
‘interactional skills’ (Collins, 2004) needed to communicate with and relate to Office staff 
and the tripartite constituents in ways that engaged them in sharing ‘what they know’.  
All process research involves some narrative element, a more or less detailed story 
based on the raw data.3 As one of several sense-making strategies for process data analysis 
(Langley, 1999), our narrative strategy was used both as a preliminary step to prepare a 
chronology of subsequent interconnected events and to ‘get on top’ of the data (i.e. to ask not 
simply ‘what is going on here?’ but ‘what is this a case of?’) (Tsoukas, 2009: 298). This 
informed, and was followed by, the intermediate step of quantification to determine patterns 
in the data and discourse over time and place. For example, extending Boockmann’s (2003: 
268) analysis of voting patterns at the ILC to the most recent period confirmed the increasing 
inability of the ILO to agree on new Conventions that might address the challenges of a 
changing world of work (cf. Standing, 2008), primarily as a result of the opposition of 
employers (more than half of the Employers’ Group voted against, abstained or simply failed 
to participate in Convention votes at the ILC over the period 1996-2016).4  
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The increasing tendency of employers ‘not to listen’ by voting against, abstaining or 
not participating in votes on proposed Conventions can be taken as a proxy for an actor 
seeking to exercise power over ideas (i.e. ‘remaining deaf’ to contradictory ideas) (Carstensen 
and Schmidt, 2016: 327). Evidence of an actor seeking to exercise power through ideas, via 
the well-known rhetorical device of repetition, was gleaned from the D-G’s biennial reports to 
the ILC, which revealed how the priorities of the Office have shifted over recent decades from 
working with civil society organizations to the decent work agenda and most recently global 
supply chains. ‘Civil society’ was prominent in the late 1990s, peaked in 2003 and then 
disappeared from the D-G’s strategic reports after 2007 (Baccaro and Mele, 2012: 211; and 
Baccaro, 2015: 283); ‘decent work’ first appeared in 1999, peaked in 2005 and then declined 
thereafter; while the word ‘chain(s)’ made only an occasional appearance between 1997 and 
2009, was not mentioned at all in 2005 and 2011, but was very prominent in Guy Ryder’s first 
strategic report to the ILC in 2013.  
Visual mapping is a particularly effective sense-making strategy for understanding 
organizational processes (Langley, 1999: 700-3). Indeed, visual maps are used by 
organizations themselves,5 most notably in the form of an organogram depicting lines of 
communication and control. Following any major restructuring, the revised organogram often 
provides a clear visual indication of the organization’s strategic (re)direction. Upon his 
appointment as D-G, Guy Ryder immediately reorganized the Office by increasing the policy 
portfolio from four to six main Departments, giving greater prominence to the Sectoral 
Policies Department (SECTOR). 6  From a research perspective, the significance of this 
reorganization was twofold. First, SECTOR was tasked with undertaking the background 
research on decent work in global supply chains in preparation for a tripartite discussion at the 
ILC. The researchers already had a long-standing relationship with SECTOR, dating back to 
the late 1990s (e.g. Turnbull, 1999, 2006 and 2013), and the PAO was tasked with 
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undertaking research for SECTOR on decent work in global supply chains (Thomas, 2016). 
Second, the work of SECTOR is almost entirely financed from the ILO’s regular budget 
determined by the tripartite constituents and endorsed by the Governing Body. This makes 
SECTOR an ideal site for in-depth research on the ILO, connecting both with the global 
priorities of the Organization and its constituents, as well as the varied policies and practices 
found in different industrial sectors. It is the latter where the tripartite constituents are 
typically ‘best placed’ to face the challenge of promoting decent work in global supply 
chains. 
From the vantage point of ‘where’ new policy ideas on decent work in global supply 
chains were most vigorously debated – SECTOR holds more tripartite (often contentious) 
meetings than any other Department – it was possible to map ‘when’ key events took place 
and ‘what’ happened, both ‘behind the scenes’ and at the formal meetings where the 
contribution of delegates to the debate is officially recorded. A visual mapping strategy allows 
for simultaneous depiction of a large number of dimensions (e.g. the hierarchy of decision-
making, the involvement of different actors, political opportunities, and the passage of time), 
albeit a ‘surface representation’ that requires other methods to dig beneath the surface 
(Langley, 1999: 700-3). Figure 1 maps the data according to ‘when’, ‘where’ and ‘what’ 
happened. Recording the timing (‘when’) of official events (e.g. meetings of the Governing 
Body and ILC) is relatively straightforward, although new policy ideas presented at key 
meetings may have been a long time in the making (‘in the mind’) before they surfaced in the 
official discourse. In fact, all process data is more or less fluid – even the same place 
(‘where’) is not a static category (e.g. the composition of the ILO’s Governing Body changes 
over time, which affects voting on the agenda for the ILC).7 ‘What’ happened is summarized 
in the narrative of Figure 1, with solid arrows indicating ‘if A then B’ (e.g. agreement at the 
ILC mandates follow up action by the Governing Body), whereas dashed arrows indicate 
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more indeterminate relationships (e.g. the D-G’s discourse on decent work in global supply 
chains may or may not resonate with constituents, political opportunities may or may not be 
seized upon, etc.), and the dotted arrows indicate actions yet to be enacted. At best, therefore, 
mapping ‘when’, ‘where’ and ‘what’ happened is no more than indicative of causality as 
constituted through a chain of events. Most importantly, Figure 1 is silent on ‘why’ events 
unfolded in this way (e.g. the framing and normative appeal of different policy ideas, power 
relations within the Office, and the scope for compromise between the tripartite constituents). 
*** FIGURE 1 HERE *** 
Our principal method to establish ‘why’ events followed a particular path was 
‘temporal bracketing’ (Langley, 1999: 703-4) or ‘process decomposition’ (Langley et al, 
2013: 7), analyzing the progression of events separated by identifiable discontinuities (a 
‘frame break’) in the temporal flow. For example, a prolonged period of ‘inactivity’ on global 
supply chains (Phase I in Figure 1) was only broken by the appointment of Guy Ryder. His 
predecessor, Juan Somavía, while acknowledging the ILO’s ‘unique expertise’ in relation to 
global supply chains, emphasized the need to ‘remain attentive to existing legal obligations 
and to business sensitivities’ (ILC.87/DG/1A: 11), a discourse that resonated with employers 
and the Asia Pacific region in particular where global supply chains are very active and 
member States have a poor record of ratification of fundamental ILO Conventions on freedom 
of association and the right to collective bargaining. More often, Somavía appeared to be 
concerned with the challenges faced by employers in the form of ‘intensified social pressures 
for good corporate practices, which have a direct bearing on consumer demand and corporate 
reputations through the media’ (ILC.87/DG/1A: 11) than with governance gaps and 
(in)decent work in global supply chains. Whereas Somavía welcomed corporate codes of 
conduct, social labelling, certification and the like as ‘social signposts to guide economic 
activity along the entire commodity chain’ (ILC.89/DG/1A: 44), leading to the accusation that 
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the ILO was now ‘an agency for globalization’ (Standing, 2008), Ryder (2015) was adamant 
that the ILO needed to ‘catch up’ on supply chains: ‘Global supply chains are vital to our 
economy, but can give rise to decent work deficits. Our task is to bridge those gaps’.8  
Throughout the period of participant observation, the interpretation of the researcher 
‘on the inside’ was ‘tested’ against the perspective of the researcher ‘on the outside’, 
generating an iterative process of reflection and abduction (i.e. empirical observations were 
connected to extant theoretical ideas to generate novel conceptual insight). The data were 
‘bracketed’ in two ways: over time (‘what has happened’ and ‘what is likely to happen next’) 
and between the tripartite constituents (e.g. asking how workers’ representatives reacted, and 
why, given the stated position of employers and government representatives, and then 
thinking about and predicting what they might do next based on reframing grounded in, and 
made possible by, the prevailing institutional frame). Temporal bracketing was determined 
largely by the sequence of official meetings of the Governing Body and ILC, punctuated by a 
political opportunity (the Rana Plaza disaster) that was seized upon by the D-G to amplify the 
norms and values of the ILO and to highlight the plight of workers in global supply chains. 
Decomposition of the data by actor focused in particular on how the ILO’s tripartite 
constituents reacted to ‘orchestration’ by the Office. 
In some situations, the response of particular actors to a particular discourse is 
(partially) predictable. For example, there is almost universal acceptance, if not always 
effective implementation, of the ILO’s Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work (1998), although employers have recently questioned the right to strike at numerous 
ILO meetings. Likewise, ‘decent work’ is now the accepted lingua franca of the international 
community, although employers prefer to talk of ‘decent and productive work’. The problem 
for any international organization with ambitious governance goals (e.g. decent work for all) 
is moderate governance capacity (states are reluctant to cede authority to international 
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organizations). However, international organizations can enlist intermediary actors – 
employers and workers organizations in the case of the ILO (Baccaro, 2015: 262) – to effect a 
significant reversal in the relationship between principal and agent: ‘instead of merely 
operating as agents controlled by state principals, [international organizations] as 
orchestrators can – through intermediaries – guide the behavior of states as targets’ (Abbott et 
al, 2015: 11).9 Albert Thomas, the ILO’s first D-G (1919-32), likened the Organization to a 
car in which the workers acted as the engine, governments as the steering wheel, and 
employers as the brakes (quoted by Maupain, 2013: 123-4), an analogy that is clearly 
supported by the data on voting at the ILC. In effect, therefore, the Office can rely on the 
votes of the workers (25 per cent), can assume the (initial) opposition of employers (25 per 
cent), and must persuade the government representatives (50 per cent) to steer in the desired 
direction. Support from the ILO is both material (e.g. technical assistance for national labour 
administration and training for the tripartite constituents at the ILO’s International Training 
Centre in Turin) and ideational (e.g. endorsing the policies of intermediaries). As Abbott et al 
(2015: 14) point out, support from an international organization ‘both empowers 
intermediaries and enhances the [international organization’s] ability to “steer” them’.  
The ‘institutionalism’ in the theory of discursive institutionalism underlines the 
importance of considering ideas and discourse in their institutional context, specifically how 
‘the substantive ideas developed and conveyed by “sentient” agents in discursive interactions 
… inform their policy-oriented actions which in turn serve to alter (or maintain) 
“institutions’” (Schmidt, 2011: 107). The ILO is a highly compound polity (governing 
activity is dispersed through multiple authorities) with an elaborate ‘coordinative discourse’ 
(cf. Schmidt, 2007: 994). There is always scope for new policy ideas in the ILO and a 
constant ‘battle for ideas’ through discourse and deliberation. Ideas are therefore empirical 
subjects to be studied in their own right (Schmidt, 2010: 14), in particular whether policy 
  
 
14 
ideas resonate with social actors and whether any new policy proposals are perceived to be 
practical and effective. After all, social action is contingent on anticipated outcomes 
(Klandermans, 1986). The ILO enjoys an exclusive mandate among international 
organizations to regulate labour and social issues (Baccaro, 2015: 263) and is able to draw on 
a powerful ‘injustice frame’ (Snow et al, 1986: 474) in order to reframe what was previously 
seen as ‘inevitable’ or ‘unfortunate’ to be ‘inexcusable’, ‘unjust’ or even ‘immoral’. Policy 
entrepreneurs within the Office know how to ‘speak of change’ and frame ideas in an 
institutional context that is not simply a ‘constraining structure’ but also an ‘enabling 
structure of meaning’. 
As depicted in Figure 1, it took a long (squiggly line) time for the idea of a policy 
debate on decent work in global supply chains to make its way onto the agenda of the ILC. 
Inaction was largely a result of the ILO’s preference for ‘promotional principles’, as opposed 
to legally binding Conventions, under the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work (1998); as well as the adoption of a ‘non-confrontational’ agenda that prioritized 
‘social dialogue’, as opposed to industrial relations, and defined labour rights ‘in terms of 
consumer choices and the market, in effect a privatization of employees and citizens’ political 
rights’ (Royle, 2010: 264). A conventional historical institutional account might attribute the 
eventual discussion of decent work in global supply chains at the ILC to the ‘exogenous 
shock’ of Rana Plaza and the political ‘window of opportunity’ that suddenly opened. But 
ideas can also ‘open windows’ – in fact, windows only open when events are ideationally 
constructed as opportunities for change (Schmidt, 2011: 108), when actors are convinced that 
it is in their interests to act collectively by coordinating their efforts and mobilizing their 
resources (Béland, 2009: 151). Like other international organizations (Béland and Orenstein, 
2013), the ILO is a place where discourse matters (i.e. text with context and words with 
deeds), a place where speaking of change – who says what to who, when, where and why – is 
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central to explaining the reframing and collective action that ultimately leads to a major 
policy transformation. 
 
Framing a path for the (vertical) governance of global supply chains 
‘to be path creating in international institutions it is first necessary to change the 
discourse’ (Deacon, 2013: 146). 
If variance analysis ‘generates know-that type of knowledge’, process data ‘produces know-
how knowledge’ (Langley et al, 2015: 4, original emphasis) extracted from a chain of events 
as opposed to (abstract) correlations between dependent and independent variables, albeit 
rarely a neat sequence where ABCD. The generative mechanisms that drive change in 
the ILO are frequently stalled (e.g. items that languish on the agenda), set back (e.g. a 
discussion that is deemed ‘premature’) or diverted (e.g. an argument in favour of better 
enforcement of existing Conventions, within national sovereign space involving the 
traditional horizontal actors, rather than a debate on a new standard that might fundamentally 
reframe the system of global labour governance). To put decent work in global supply chains 
on the agenda of the ILO (the first step from A towards D, albeit not necessarily via B and C) 
required orchestration by the Office, specifically the provision of ideational resources in 
favour of labour to win sufficient support from governments to overcome employer 
opposition. Once a policy idea is on the agenda of the ILC and dialogue begins, ‘any 
assumptions underlying even taken-for-granted constructions become “fair game” as long as 
the conversants, who are stakeholders to the problem, see their exposition as incurring serious 
scrutiny’ (Raelin, 2008: 521).  
While no speech situation is ‘ideal’ in terms of inclusiveness, equal voice, and the 
absence of deception and coercion (Habermas, 1984), at the ILC every member State enjoys 
equal representation (two government, one employer and one worker representative), capital 
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and labour are on an equal footing (each with a 25 per cent share of the votes), and non-
governmental organizations and other interested parties are often invited to speak (although 
not to vote). The discourse is comprehensible (at least to insiders well-versed in politically 
acceptable ‘ILO speak’), informed by long-standing and widely accepted normative values 
(labour is not a commodity), usually sincere (certainly for words if not always for deeds) and 
ultimately ‘agreed’ (the constituents might frame the problem and prescription very 
differently but must invariably find the words for an ‘agreed text’). The parliament of labour 
is a place where workers’ representatives in particular can ‘find their voice’ and ‘speak out’ in 
ways not merely sanctioned by position qua position but because of their self-identified 
interests and commitment to the working class. It is a place for ‘emancipatory discourse’ 
(Raelin, 2008: 524), not simply ‘diagnostic framing’ (problem recognition) but ‘prognostic 
framing’ (proposing solutions) and ‘motivational framing’ (mobilizing adherents and 
demobilizing detractors) (Benford and Snow, 2000: 615). This is the institutional context in 
which the Office sought to progress an item for discussion languishing before the Governing 
Body onto the agenda of the ILC. 
Phase I: inertia and inactivity 
The Workers’ Group in the Governing Body first raised the issue of decent work in global 
supply chains in March 2006 (GB.295/PV, para.6; see also Figure 1). The Office 
subsequently wrote up a proposal for the next Governing Body in November 2006 to ‘focus 
on structural changes taking place in key sectors of the global economy and the impact on the 
quantity, quality and distribution of employment’ (GB.297/2, para.70). In selecting which 
proposals from a list of six to consider in greater detail, only the Workers’ Group and a 
handful of governments (Argentina, Czech Republic, Germany and the UK) supported the 
proposal on decent work in global supply chains. The Employers’ Group, while not explicitly 
rejecting the proposal, highlighted the importance of horizontal as opposed to vertical 
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regulation (diversion), noting that ILO standards ‘covered almost all possible situations and 
relationships in the world of work. The important thing was therefore not so much to develop 
new general standards [ILO Conventions], but rather to ensure that existing standards were 
applied more effectively’ (GB.297/PV, para.5). 
 Proposals before the Governing Body ‘rarely die’, they simply languish as an item for 
discussion and ‘move up and down’ in the priorities of the tripartite constituents, as 
interpreted by the Office (PAO notes). The Workers’ Group continued to support the proposal 
for an agenda item on decent work in global supply chains at every subsequent meeting of the 
Governing Body between 2007 and 2013. Employers’ opposition was unyielding if not 
always explicit – on most occasions they simply supported other proposals and said little or 
nothing about global supply chains (i.e. exercising power over ideas by ‘refusing to listen’).10 
The Rana Plaza disaster in Bangladesh (April 2013), killing more than 1 100 workers, 
dramatically changed the discourse outside the ILO and led to an Accord between two global 
union federations (GUFs) and over 200 multinationals, with the ILO as an independent chair 
(Reinecke and Donaghey, 2015). This was a significant step towards a new role for the ILO in 
global labour governance, working directly with international actors (TNCs and GUFs) rather 
than the Organization’s tripartite constituents in this particular industrial sector (as under the 
Better Work Programme). But if the ILO was to inter-connect both its traditional constituents 
(horizontal labour governance) and the organizations embroiled in global supply chains 
(vertical labour governance), then it was beholden on the Office and the D-G to re-frame the 
policy debate by initiating a new coordinative discourse inside the Organization. 
Phase II: orchestration and opportunity 
In seeking to consciously change the system of global labour governance through 
deliberation, contestation and consensus-building around an agreed ‘text’, policy 
entrepreneurs in international organizations can draw on rational-legal authority from their 
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constitution, delegated legitimacy from member States, moral legitimacy that comes from 
their mission, and expert legitimacy based on widely recognized and accepted knowledge 
(Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 25). The constitution of the ILO grants the Office autonomy 
rather than rational-legal authority and member States have been reluctant to cede authority to 
the ILO or even ratify the majority of the Organization’s Conventions. The Office must 
therefore draw on its considerable moral legitimacy and establish its expert legitimacy in an 
area (global supply chains) not previously considered within its remit. As a former General 
Secretary of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), Guy Ryder certainly 
considered global supply chains to be within his remit. Moreover, his framing of the issues – 
the ‘politics of signification’ (Snow and Benford, 1988: 190) – was highly critical of global 
supply chains: ‘what is not acceptable, is that companies shift production and locate supply 
chains to avoid trade unions and to avoid respect for worker rights. That is not about 
comparative advantage. It’s about absolute abuse, and any approach to the global economy 
has to make it impossible’ (Ryder, 2003; see also Ryder 2007).  
As Director-General of the ILO, like all other D-Gs before him, Ryder is more 
‘measured’ in his official language (‘ILO speak’) and avoids ‘naming’ and implicitly 
‘shaming’ any specific member State(s) where the violation of health and safety regulations 
or other abuses of workers’ rights are in the spotlight. Nonetheless, in his first strategic report 
to the ILC, less than a month after the Rana Plaza disaster, there were two references, explicit 
to the insider, to what is widely considered to be the third worst industrial accident of all time:  
‘The labour issues related to supply chains periodically hit the headlines when a case 
of serious abuse is brought to public attention or when a tragedy occurs at a 
workplace, causing appalling loss of life’ (ILC.102/DG/1A, para.141). 
‘… the ILO is the object of pointed criticism for having failed to take up its own 
responsibilities’ (ILC.102/DG/1A, para.141). 
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Compared to the response of Francis Blanchard (D-G from 1974 to 1989) to the Bhopal 
disaster in 1984 – ‘On the specific issue of safety and health, for instance, who can fail to be 
impressed by the human and economic cost, exemplified by recent tragic examples, of the 
insufficient attention given to the subject?’ (ILC.71/DG/1A: 17) – Ryder’s language in 
response to Rana Plaza was more specific (a single ‘case’ vs. unspecified ‘examples’), 
emotive (‘serious abuse’ and ‘appalling loss of life’ vs. ‘impressed by’) and certainly more 
self-critical (‘own responsibilities’ of the ILO vs. ‘insufficient attention’ of unnamed social 
actors). The D-G’s discourse in response to Bhopal produced nothing other than a non-
binding Resolution on dangerous substances. The response to Rana Plaza, in contrast, not 
only involved the ILO stepping up to chair the Bangladesh Accord – itself an unprecedented 
step and a new institutional role for the Organization – but the articulation of a new discourse 
that created an opportunity for public as opposed to private forms of vertical labour 
governance.  
In order to mobilize support for a discussion on decent work in global supply chains at 
the ILC, in his first strategic report the new D-G pointed out that: ‘Proposals for a Conference 
[ILC] discussion on decent work in global supply chains have yet to meet with the support of 
the Governing Body, which will, nevertheless, have an early opportunity to return to the 
matter’ (ILC.102/DG/1A, para.76). This is ‘ILO speak’ for ‘the Governing Body needs to 
urgently address this matter’ (PAO notes). To reinforce the point, the D-G subsequently noted 
that: ‘The Governing Body has in fact examined, but not so far acted on, the option of 
including the question of global supply chains in the agenda of a Conference session. It may 
wish to give further consideration to this in the future’ (ILC.102/DG/1A, para.142). The 
‘future’, in this context, is ‘ILO speak’ for ASAP (PAO notes).  
As expected, the employers continued to oppose (divert) any discussion on decent 
work in global supply chains through ACT/EMP (the Bureau for Employers’ Activities within 
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the Office) (PAO notes) and in the Governing Body. In response to the Rana Plaza tragedy, 
for example, they argued that: (i) the problem in Bangladesh was building regulations, not 
labour standards; (ii) most of the garment industry in Bangladesh was producing for the 
domestic market and responsibility therefore fell to national political authorities and not 
enterprises, multi-national or otherwise, to legislate for and enforce human rights and 
fundamental social standards; (iii) multi-national enterprises were not a ‘fourth constituency’ 
of the ILO and the Office should work with and respect the roles of the International 
Organization of Employers (IOE) and ACT/EMP; and (iv) any attempt by the ILO to 
integrate public and private, horizontal and vertical labour governance would be futile, as 
‘relationships within global supply chains were more like affairs than marriages’ 
(ILC.102/PR/11, para.94) and rather than ‘pearls on a string … it would be more accurate to 
compare them to a dish of spaghetti. If you tried to pull them apart, it was unclear where the 
other end was’ (ILC.102/PR/11, para.9). 
Power through ideas is dependent on normative values and cognitive validity in 
relation to a given community (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016: 324) and it was immediately 
evident that the employers’ framing of the Rana Plaza disaster failed to resonate with the ILC. 
As a result, and building on the D-G’s ‘instruction’ on global supply chains to the Governing 
Body, the Office was able to orchestrate the Workers’ Group in alliance with a sufficient 
number of government representatives from developed countries, Brazil and the Africa 
Group, to insert into the agreed Conclusions of the ILC in 2013 a request for the Governing 
Body to consider supply chains as an agenda item for the ILC no later than 2016 
(ILC.102/PR/11: 65). To make the next step possible, a new proposal from the Office for 
decent work in global supply chains was now urgently needed. 
The proposal was written by SECTOR and emphasized the importance of 
‘understanding … the decent work challenges at the sector-specific level … further 
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underlining the need to reinforce the sectoral approach to decent work’ (GB.319/INS/2, 
para.5). SECTOR is well-placed to bridge ‘unmobilized sentiment pools’ (Snow et al, 1986: 
467) – workers in different industries/countries connected by global supply chains who share 
common grievances but who lack the organizational base for exploiting their discontent – and 
policy entrepreneurs within the Department are able to ‘stand apart’ from the prevailing order 
of the world (Cox, 1981: 129) and not only ask ‘how it came about’ but also ‘how it might 
change’. Through the orchestration of the Office, and more specifically SECTOR, the 
proposal on global supply chains moved up the agenda before the Governing Body, from fifth 
(of six items) in November 2006 to third (of six items) in March 2013 and then first (of seven 
items) in October 2013. The Employers’ Group and several Asia-Pacific member States 
fearful of losing foreign direct investment were no longer able to silence the workers and the 
governments who supported the proposal, but it was still to be decided whether the 
preparations for the ILC discussion in June 2016 would be led by SECTOR (the preference of 
the workers) or ENTERPRISES (the preference of employers). Following a period of 
‘political points trading’ between Departments (PAO notes), an ILO-wide task team was 
established with SECTOR very firmly in the driver’s seat.  
The power to set the agenda of the ILC was precipitated by a reframing of the 
coordinative policy discourse from the ‘horizontal’ to the ‘vertical’: 
‘For the ILO, whose interest and responsibilities are centred on the labour practices 
along these chains, the corresponding question is whether it is sufficient to continue to 
address these matters purely by reference to the States which are its members and 
which are legally bound to apply ratified Conventions. The responsibilities of member 
States are not diminished or supplanted by global supply chains. But the fact that 
private actors are the drivers of the constantly shifting supply chains or production 
networks that increasingly characterize international trade and investment would seem 
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to indicate that there are additional opportunities for the ILO to promote decent work 
in their operations’ (ILC.102/DG/1A, para.75 emphasis added).  
The significance of this reframing was not lost on the tripartite constituents: the ILO was 
seeking to depart from its traditional path of horizontal labour regulation (i.e. the territorial 
embedding of economic and social relations between capital, labour and the state), by 
‘intertwining’ a new system of vertical labour governance along the supply chain (i.e. the 
vertical organization and flow of value activities across multiple scales from the global to the 
local). The idea, in other words, was to develop a system of labour governance that would 
incorporate both the organizational scales (vertical dimension) of global production network 
actors and their territorial embedding (horizontal interfaces) (cf. Coe and Yeung, 2015: 68). 
 To integrate the horizontal and the vertical, social actors must accept their 
responsibilities along the supply chain, most notably the idea that a TNC in Country X can be 
held responsible for the employment practices of its suppliers in Country Y. In short, any 
change in material conditions for workers must start with the idea of responsibility for decent 
work across borders. The D-G clearly stated this idea of extending the ILO’s ‘interests and 
responsibilities’ to the ‘labour practices along [global supply] chains’ (ILC.102/DG/1A, 
para.75). Previously, however, any such involvement on the part of the ILO has been limited. 
Under the system of ‘vertical private governance’ depicted in the left hand side of 
Figure 2, labour standards rest ultimately in the hands of lead firms in the supply chain and 
their voluntary codes of corporate conduct. As Guy Ryder has readily acknowledged, ‘the 
ILO really missed the boat of the CSR [corporate social responsibility] explosion’ (Ryder, 
2015). Likewise, the ILO has no involvement in international framework agreements and 
even under the Accord, in its capacity as an independent chair, the Organization has been 
unable to bring the Bangladeshi government and smaller sub-contractors to the table on a 
regular basis (PAO notes). Better Work is a more successful initiative in terms of its scope 
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and substantive outcomes (Posthuma and Rossi, 2017), but like the Accord is sector-specific 
(textiles and garments) and is a horizontal rather than a vertical form of governance. To go 
beyond these initiatives, and indeed beyond the ILO’s historic horizontal remit, called for a 
strategic reframing that would move the Organization towards the right-hand side of Figure 2. 
***FIGURE 2 HERE*** 
Phase III: horizontal and vertical governance 
The conventional system of ILO Conventions is often misunderstood and misclassified as a 
form of ‘vertical public governance’ (Gereffi and Lee, 2016: 30). While clearly a public 
(multi-level) form of governance – member States decide whether or not to ratify 
international Conventions – the implementation and enforcement of labour standards does not 
follow the vertical (cross-border) lines of global supply chains but the horizontal (territorial) 
space of member States’ jurisdiction. In particular, TNCs are not directly represented via the 
ILO’s tripartite structure, as the members of IOE are national employer associations who are 
expected to respect national employment laws, regardless of whether or not these comply with 
ILO Conventions. Clearly, the remit of national employer associations, and by extension the 
IOE, does not extend to cross-border labour regulation.  
 The organization of the ITUC mirrors that of the IOE, inasmuch as the Confederation 
represents the interest of national trade union federations. However, whereas IOE does not 
routinely invite TNCs as observers at tripartite meetings of the ILO, the ITUC is keen to 
involve GUFs in sectoral meetings, recognizing that the industry-based global federations 
best represent the (vertical) interests of workers who are connected via global supply chains. 
Moreover, it is at the sectoral level that the ILO has implemented one of the most innovative 
instruments for global labour regulation, the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) 2006 
(Bollé, 2006), registered in the SECTOR framework of the ILO, which represents a ‘new 
paradigm for global labour rights implementation’ (Lillie, 2008: 191). International shipping 
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is one of the most difficult sectors to regulate – globalization had displaced the industry ‘into 
a disembedded transnational space’ (Lillie, 2008: 197) – and the MLC was a long time in the 
making (first discussed at the ILC in 2001, formally adopted in 2006 but only entered into 
force on 20 August 2013, one year after reaching the ‘threshold’ for ratification of 30 member 
States). Nonetheless, the MLC is one of the most comprehensive ILO Conventions, covering 
over 90 per cent of world gross tonnage of shipping, and more importantly it gives the ‘port 
state’, wherever a vessel calls, the right to inspect conditions on board foreign ‘flag state’ 
vessels. In other words, ‘the MLC will have member States enforcing labour standards 
directly on each other’s ships’ (Lillie, 2006: 192 original emphasis), thereby preventing 
TNCs exploiting ‘spaces of exception’ (the ‘flags of convenience’ with more favourable tax 
laws and much weaker employment protection). Thus, international shipping is re-embedded 
not by the port state enforcing national law but the standards set out in the MLC. 
 While the Office, ITUC, GUFs and other labour organizations try to connect workers 
along the vertical supply chain, the employers deny any connection, or more precisely 
prescribe the traditional horizontal path of tripartite regulation within sovereign member 
States. The incongruous position of the protagonists was openly and acrimoniously debated 
over nine days at the ILC in June 2016 (four days of plenary discussion in the ILC, two days 
in committee drafting Conclusions and three further days of plenary discussion of the draft 
Conclusions in the ILC). For the Employers’ Group, ‘The only way to ensure that all workers 
are equally protected is to develop strong national institutions that can implement and enforce 
laws covering all companies and workers within its borders, regardless of whether they 
participate in cross border supply chains’ (PAO notes). For the Workers’ Group, in contrast, a 
purely territorial approach was far too limited: 
‘Everyone is connected but no one is responsible. We need accountability and 
governance, particularly from the “economic employer”, the lead firm in the supply 
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chain. We need standards that apply wherever the supply chain reaches. There can be 
no excuses, no exemptions, no blaming abuses on the local management just because 
it’s a subcontractor or far from the home country’ (PAO notes). 
The Workers’ Group proposed that the ‘economic employer’ could be held 
accountable via a Convention ‘on decent work in global supply chains, which can and should 
provide the basis for a new approach to labour regulation and enforcement at the international 
level, much the way that the Maritime Labour Convention has for the maritime industry’ 
(PAO notes). The potential of a ‘global MLC’ was an idea the Workers’ Group advocated on 
numerous occasions to highlight the limitations of horizontal regulation, the need for vertical 
regulation, and the new repertoire of policy options available to the ILO and its constituents: 
‘Most laws and international conventions stop at the borders, the model of regulation 
in the ILO being to set minimum standards at the global level that need to be ratified 
in national legislation, which has only territorial effect. The Maritime Labour 
Convention is an interesting example of a new approach, going beyond national 
borders, which can help us identify innovative ways forward’ (PAO notes). 
Crucially, the rhetorical framing of the workers’ position won support from a majority of 
member States, with particularly strong support from the European Union group led by the 
Netherlands, which held the Presidency of the EU at the time (see Figure 1). While some 
governments stayed true to conventional ILO speak – the US representative, for example, 
politely noted that ‘not everyone played by the rules’ (PAO notes) – the discourse of the 
Africa Group was far more emotive, describing indecent work as the result of ‘intentional 
design’ by TNCs of their global supply chains (Namibia representative, PAO notes). Only 
member States from the Asia Pacific region (e.g. Bangladesh and India) expressed any 
forthright opposition to the proposal for a new standard on decent work in global supply 
chains. 
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Breaking their previous silence on this issue, the employers’ obloquy was initially 
directed towards the background research reports produced by the Office, which identified 
governance gaps and decent work deficits in numerous sector-specific global supply chains. 
In seeking to undermine the ILO’s expert legitimacy – any moral legitimacy the employers 
might lay claim to was already lost – the Employers’ Group argued that while ‘relevant, 
verifiable data is a fundamental prerequisite for good policy making’, the ILO ‘must do more 
to generate the data needed and launch more relevant research’ (PAO notes). The employers 
then cited ten studies not included in the Office’s analysis that were claimed to demonstrate 
the beneficial effects of cross-border supply chains. An immediate review of these studies 
revealed that none purported to be about global supply/value chains; eight focused on the 
impact of exports on wages; of these, five found that exporting was associated with increased 
inequality of earnings between more skilled/white collar workers and less skilled/blue collar 
workers; while two studies reported that exporting was associated with lower wages, contrary 
to the employers’ claim that cross-border supply chains were ‘ladders for development’ that 
‘do not pose a unique challenge to decent work’ (PAO notes). Rather than highlight the 
‘irrelevance’ of the employers’ preferred research, and to avoid any unnecessary 
confrontation, the Workers’ Group cited the research of Gary Gereffi and Richard Locke to 
amplify their arguments for a new standard to promote decent work in global supply chains.  
A total of 121 amendments, the vast majority from the Employers’ Group, were 
received on seven pages of ‘concluding’ text, with the first day of contentious discussions on 
the draft Conclusions adjourning at 23:00 and 01:30 on the second day (all other Committees 
working on other ILC agenda items finished their work by 18:00 every evening). In a 6-hour 
debate on the word ‘standard’, the Employers’ Group sought to exclude this word from the 
Conclusions of the ILC, thereby attempting to prevent the idea of a Convention on decent 
work in global supply chains going forward to the Governing Body. Once again, the Office 
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and the Workers’ Group commanded the moral high ground: ‘It’s a sad day for the ILO when 
this house cannot discuss “standards”’ (Workers’ spokesperson, PAO notes). Of the 25 agreed 
points in the Resolution and Conclusions the most significant was saved until last: 
‘There is concern that current ILO standards may not be fit for purpose to achieve 
decent work in global supply chains. Therefore, the ILO should review this issue and 
convene, as soon as appropriate, by decision of the Governing Body, a technical 
tripartite meeting or a meeting of experts to: (a) Assess the failures which lead to 
decent work deficits in global supply chains. (b) Identify the salient challenges of 
governance to achieving decent work in global supply chains. (c) Consider what 
guidance, programmes, measures, initiatives or standards are needed to promote 
decent work and/or facilitate reducing decent work deficits in global supply chains’ 
(ILC.105/PR/14-1, para.25). 
For IndustriALL, a signatory of the Bangladesh Accord and one of the most active GUFs that 
has signed 47 international framework agreements with TNCs covering 10 million workers, 
‘Inclusion of the word “standard” is crucial as this allows the possibility of a future 
Convention to be squarely on the agenda’ (IndustriALL, 2016). The International Transport 
Workers’ Federation (ITF) echoed these sentiments: ‘We could finally see protection for 
workers in global supply chains, wherever they are based, by ensuring accountability and 
governance, particularly from the lead firm in the chain. We’ve done it before for seafarers, 
with the ground-breaking ILO Maritime Labour Convention’ (ITF, 2016). Inside the Office, 
many officials regard para.25 of the Resolution and Conclusions as a change to the very 
mandate of the ILO (PAO notes). 
 Although the D-G maintains a strong belief in the capacity of the ILO’s tripartite 
constituency to innovate and make progress on a range of issues, as a policy entrepreneur he 
readily acknowledges that leadership in the Organization is vital (PAO notes). Thus, change 
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can start with a policy idea from the tripartite constituents or within the Office, but whatever 
the origin it is unlikely to progress without orchestration based on a reframing of the policy 
agenda that is rooted in the practice and immediate experience of individuals and groups. 
Employers tried but failed to derail the discourse – they talked of employment opportunities 
(rather than decent work) in cross-border (as opposed to global) supply chains, and tried to 
talk up existing (ineffective) Conventions (horizontal regulation) rather than acknowledge the 
need for a new paradigm of global labour governance (vertical regulation along chains and 
across borders) (PAO notes). As is their wont, they once more applied the brakes, but quickly 
discovered that the brake pads were severely worn by the discourse, and the evidence, on 
(in)decent work in global supply chains.  
The direction of travel is never smooth at the ILO, but the process is still moving 
forward (see Figure 1), with the Governing Body (October 2016) requesting the Office to 
organize three meetings on: (i) possible action to promote decent work in export processing 
zones (in 2017), (ii) cross-border social dialogue to address decent work in global supply 
chains (in 2018), and (iii) governance gaps and decent work in global supply chains (in 2019) 
(GB/328/INS/5). These meetings are key stages in a Roadmap published in March 2017 
(running to 2022) that sets out in detail the specific steps in the ILO’s self-proclaimed ‘theory 
of change’ to significantly reduce decent work deficits in global supply chains 
(GB/329/INS/3/2).  
 
Conclusions 
Although ideas and discourse precede, legitimize and actuate policy change, there is a danger 
of conflating the notion that ‘ideas matter’ with the ‘power of ideas’ (Carstensen and Schmidt, 
2016) such that a simple (re)framing within an ‘accepted discourse’ (decent work), amplified 
through carefully chosen words (‘ILO speak’), would somehow persuade the tripartite 
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constituents that global supply chains created ‘governance gaps’ under traditional (horizontal) 
standard-setting that the ILO needed to address. Strategic framing that ultimately demands 
collective action is an inherently contentious process. By October 2013, the Employers’ 
Group in the ILO was no longer able to exercise ‘power over ideas’ by ‘refusing to listen’ (i.e. 
preventing decent work in global supply chains making its way onto the agenda of the ILC), 
but likewise the Workers’ Group was subsequently unable to exercise ‘power through ideas’ 
by persuading the employers of the cognitive validity or normative value of their particular 
worldview. To be sure, the moral evaluation of policy ideas can be ‘taken as read’ within the 
ILO, since labour is not a commodity and all workers have a right to decent work, but what is 
always contested, and never fully settled, is the particular problem definition, any causal 
interpretation and consequent policy recommendation(s). As a result, in the absence of 
reframing and orchestration by the Office, the ILO would remain ‘adrift’ and increasingly 
irrelevant in the face of globalization. This is indeed the prevailing consensus among 
historical institutionalists, but only because such accounts are largely silent on the social 
construction of the policy ideas that policy entrepreneurs seek to promote in international 
organizations.  
Discursive institutionalism, in contrast, focuses on the interactive processes through 
which ideas are conveyed, exchanged, and prioritized, in the institutional setting in which 
these ideas ‘make sense’ and ultimately ‘matter’. Openings and opportunities for reframing 
are made possible by personal biographies (Guy Ryder’s in particular), existing institutional 
frames (e.g. the MLC), and political opportunities (most notably Rana Plaza), provided these 
are seized upon and framed in the service of an internal coordinative policy discourse 
orchestrated by the Office that resonates with the day-to-day practice and ‘lived experience’ 
of the tripartite constituents (especially labour). In seeking to reframe the system of global 
labour governance through the organizational dynamics of global supply chains, the ILO has 
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embarked on a path that might ultimately lead to a very different, potentially paradigm-
shifting approach to governing employment relationships in the global economy. After almost 
a century of supporting its tripartite constituents at the national level, the Conclusions of the 
ILC in 2016 signal a reorientation of the ILO towards a system of vertical public governance 
that will not only bolster the position of national actors by providing additional leverage to 
embed transnational actors in the sovereign space of member States, but will also encourage 
States to enforce international standards on other States and actors connected through global 
supply chains. 
 A new standard for decent work in global supply chains will no doubt be a long time 
in the making. But just as the MLC has achieved much greater coverage than any other 
sector-specific Convention (as a percentage of the workforce as opposed to ratification by 
member States), the potential impact of a new standard for global supply chains is much 
greater than conventional (horizontal) ILO governance. Governance gaps would no doubt 
remain, but the ILO is the only international organization with a mandate to close existing 
gaps through public as opposed to private regulation. The success, or otherwise, of the ILO’s 
reframing of global labour governance cannot be overstated – it will speak volumes for the 
continuing relevance of the ILO in an age of globalization and the prospects of decent work 
for millions of workers around the globe. 
                                                        
1 References to the Governing Body of the ILO are reported as GB with the relevant session 
(e.g. 323), the section or committee number (e.g. Institutional or ‘INS’), number of the 
document (e.g. 2) and paragraph (e.g. 1) or page number. Any subsequent reference to the 
written report or proceedings is denoted by the abbreviation ‘PV’ (procès-verbaux). 
Subsequent references to the Provisional Record (PR) or Director-General’s (D-G) report of 
the International Labour Conference (ILC) follow the same nomenclature. 
2 Ryder was a former General Secretary of the International Trade Union Confederation. All 
previous D-Gs have worked for the government in their respective member States. 
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3 After every meeting attended by the PAO, and following any other significant interaction 
with colleagues and tripartite constituents, reflective notes were recorded in a journal to 
highlight ‘who said what, to who, where and why’, as well as any potential or actual impact 
on ideas, discourse, reframing and subsequent policy change. Observational data are reported 
as ‘PAO notes’ in the text.  
4 A Convention is not adopted if the number of votes cast for and against is less than half the 
number of delegates attending the ILC and non-participants rarely report their absence from 
the voting session. Thus, abstention and, ipso facto, non-participation at the ILC constitutes a 
‘real weapon’ for blocking votes considered ‘politically inexpedient’ (Maupain, 1987: 487). 
5 A visual mapping of the process of adopting an ILO Convention is available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
normes/documents/image/wcms_084158.pdf  
6 SECTOR was previously a specialist department under Social Dialogue. Workers’ 
representatives, especially the global union federations (GUFs), had lobbied for a freestanding 
department focused on industrial sectors. Employers lobbied for the elevation of 
ENTERPRISES (previously under Employment), which is now also a freestanding policy 
department.  
7 The agenda of the ILC is set by the Governing Body, which is comprised of: 28 Government 
members (including ten sets held permanently by States of ‘chief industrial importance’, 
namely Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation, the UK 
and USA, with the other Government members elected by the ILC every three years), 14 
Employer members, and 14 Worker members.  
8 https://twitter.com/GuyRyder/status/755414872238817281  
9 It is worth noting that around 80 per cent of the ILC agenda items proposed to the 
Governing Body originate in the Office compared to 20 per cent from members of the 
Governing Body (GB.268/3, para.3). 
10 A minority of member States consistently supported the proposal. Among the permanent 
member States of ‘chief industrial importance’ (see note 7) there was consistent support from 
France, Germany, Italy, the UK and USA. Other European States elected to the Governing 
Body for a 3-year term also supported the proposal (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Greece, Hungary, 
Netherlands, the Nordic countries and Poland), as did Australia and Canada. The Africa 
Group (Congo, Egypt, Niger, Tanzania, Togo and Zambia) elected in 2011 also supported the 
proposal. 
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Figure 1. Mapping the ILO’s reframing of decent work in global supply chains 
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Figure 2. The ILO and global labour governance  
Note: * If all 187 member States of the ILO ratified all 189 Conventions, there would be 35 343 ratifications in total whereas the actual number 
is just over 8 000. Although the fundamental Conventions (C.29, C.87, C.98, C.100, C.105, C.111, C.138 and C.182) must be respected by all 
ILO member States by virtue of membership, the Conventions on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (No.87, 
1948) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining (No.98, 1949) cover less than 50 per cent of world’s population. 
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